The carrier’s own system
Gate-out, load, vessel departure, discharge — read directly from carrier APIs against the DCSA event model, never from a response somebody forwarded us.
One question, answered cryptographically, for anyone who needs it. Proof is a verification and attestation layer for Africa–Asia trade: it registers documents, checks them against sources with no stake in the deal, and issues signed facts that outlive us.
A commercial invoice from the seller is a claim. A bill of lading forwarded by the buyer is a claim. Almost every trade fraud in this corridor works because somebody treated a claim as evidence — and the most expensive one is simply the same shipment financed twice.
Gate-out, load, vessel departure, discharge — read directly from carrier APIs against the DCSA event model, never from a response somebody forwarded us.
Assigned by the network and rotated, never selected by a party to the transaction. Geotagged, timestamped, cross-checked against the bill of lading and the packing list.
Corporate registries on both sides, and customs records where they are reachable. Facts from institutions with nothing to gain from the answer.
It may be perfectly genuine. It is still not evidence, and we will not sign a statement saying it is.
Source reliability is scored and published. A carrier confirmation and a photographed PDF are not the same evidence and are never shown as though they were.
An unreachable source produces an unknown, not an approval. Unknown is a state here too.
Four things, in that order. Each one is useless without the one before it.
Every document is hashed and recorded: proforma, commercial invoice, bill of lading, packing list, inspection certificate, Form M reference. Only the fingerprint is stored, never the document. The registry answers one question — has this been seen before, by anyone in the network?
Each condition is checked against a source with no stake in the outcome. Carrier systems for movement, an assigned inspector for condition, registries for identity, customs where reachable.
Each verified condition becomes a signed, portable credential — this bill of lading exists with this carrier; this container loaded at this port on this date; this consignee matches this entity. Built on the W3C Verifiable Credentials model, following the UN/CEFACT direction for trade documents.
Registry entries and attestation hashes are anchored on a public chain. That gives a first-registration time nobody can forge — which, in a double-financing dispute, is the entire argument.
An attestation outlives us. Because it follows the verifiable-credential model, anyone can check its authenticity and integrity without contacting Nomapay — no account, no API key, and no dependence on this company still existing. If you are lending against it, that property matters more than anything else on this page.
This distinction is the whole architecture, and it is deliberately absolute. A credential says what is true. Somebody else decides what to do about it.
Not for a second, not in transit, not as a convenience. Proof sits beside the money and never in it.
If we could move funds when parties disagree, we would have authority over those funds. Disputes go to an arbitral body, the parties’ own counsel, or an on-chain process we do not operate.
Reference escrow contracts are published open source, immutable, with no Nomapay signer. A contract we could change is a contract we control.
Priced per verification, per attestation, per report, per seat. Never a share of the value being moved — a cut of the transaction would make us a party to it.
Each of these looks like an obvious revenue upgrade from the outside, and each one would change what this is. They are written into how the product is reviewed, not only into how it is described.
Raw documents never enter the registry. What is submitted is a salted, normalised hash — enough to detect that the same document has been seen twice, and not enough to reconstruct what it said.
Every schema is a declarative statement with a source and a timestamp. There is no field in any credential that instructs anybody to pay anything.
From the credential and its chain anchor alone. No call to us, ever.
An attestation is never edited. If something turns out to be wrong, a correcting attestation is issued and both remain on the record.
You can see what kind of evidence sat behind a statement, not merely that a statement was made.
Not as an escrow party, not as an arbiter, not as an emergency measure.
Nigeria imported goods worth ₦11.01 trillion from China in the first half of 2026 — 39.27% of a total import bill of ₦28.04 trillion, up from ₦9.62tn in the same period of 2025, even as total imports fell. Asia supplied ₦16.12tn across the half-year.
Duplicate-financing checks, document validation, counterparty history. The clearest loss-avoidance case in the corridor.
Verified shipment events and performance history — underwriting inputs that currently do not exist in any usable form.
Supplier verification before the money leaves. Does this company exist, does the address resolve, have these goods shipped before, do the codes match what was declared?
Every figure above is drawn from published trade statistics. Nothing on this page is a claim about volume passing through Nomapay.
A supplier you were not sure about, a document you could not confirm, a payment you sent on trust because checking was impossible. That is the case we are trying to answer.